Printing costs of Oireachtas members

Thanks to Catherine Halloran of the Daily Star for sharing the results of this FOI with us. Catherine asked for the number of Christmas cards printed by the Oireachtas printing presses for each TD and Senator, broken down on a individual basic for each TD and Senator and a full breakdown of printing costs in 2012, broken down for each TD and Senator. A total €276,133.96 was spent on printing facilities for members. Here are details of the release:



The top 20 Members:

Member Amount
Richard Bruton € 18,935.17
Robert Dowds € 11,694.80
Regina Doherty € 9,180.03
Richard Boyd Barrett € 6,865.95
Mary Mitchell OConnor € 6,114.87
Lucinda Creighton € 4,831.80
Alan Farrell € 4,817.51
Philip Hogan € 4,794.51
Sandra McLellan € 4,625.99
Micheal Martin € 4,584.02
Patrick ODonovan € 4,331.31
Niall Collins € 4,070.34
Derek Keating € 3,939.11
Robert Troy € 3,866.18
Martin Conway € 3,855.58
Mark Daly € 3,563.76
Martin Heydon € 3,368.14
Patrick Nulty € 3,304.75
Frances Fitzgerald € 3,284.32
Marcella Corcoran Kennedy € 3,187.62

And the full results:

Data

Data

This is the breakdown by party membership:

Swords -v- OCEI: Was there ever any doubt over search and retrieval charges for AIE?

The recent appeal decision by the Commissioner for Environmental Information highlights that during the previous five years search and retrieval fees have been wrongly charged by public authorities for requests for access to environmental information. The decision also provides a good opportunity to summarise how the provisions of Directive 2003/4/EC relating to fees have been interpreted in Ireland and the UK.

The impermisibility of charging search and retrieval fees has been clear since an earlier 2008 decision of the Commissioner in Open Focus and Sligo County Council. In that case (which was not appealed) the issue of discretionary fees, although not the main issue, was examined in detail by the Commissioner who found that search and retrieval fees are not permitted:

“Furthermore, in order for a decision maker within the Council to deal with the request for information and form a view as to whether it could be supplied under the Regulations, it would be necessary for the information at issue to be identified and retrieved. There is no provision in the Directive or in the Regulations for the charging of fees for the processing of a request for access to environmental information. Following the assessment of the information and, as in this case, a decision to release it, I consider that it is the next step – the supply of the information to the requester in copy form – that potentially attracts the charge.”

Accordingly since May 2008 public authorities should have been under no doubt that search and retrieval fees were not permitted to be charged. Worryingly the Open Focus decision seems to have been completely ignored by most public authorities including, it must be said, the Department of the Environment which up until this month continued to publish guidelines which explicitly stated that search and retrieval fees could be charged.

Only after the Commissioner decided against the Department of the Environment itself has it finally decided to modify its guidelines to bring them into compliance with the Open Focus decision.

Interestingly the issue had not been subject to a definitive adjudication in the UK until 2011 when the Upper Tier Tribunal in Kirklees Council v Information Commissioner and PALI Ltd [2011] UKUT 104 held that such fees may not be charged for in situ examination and the First Tier Tribunal further held in Leeds City Council -v- Information Commissioner that charges could only be levied for the costs of transferring environmental information (e.g. costs of reproduction) to a requestor who did not wish to examine it in situ. Each of these cases arose from appeals by commercial property searchers (who provide responses to standard Law Society questionnaires as part of conveyancing transactions) against search and retrieval fees charged by local authorities for access to environmental information required by them to fill out the search questionnaires.

The UTT in Kirklees had little doubt on the issue:

“[98] We also disagree with Mr Coppel’s submission that the word “supply” in that sense can be extended to cover the process of locating and retrieving information for examination.  We consider that the proper reading of Article 5(2) of the Directive and Regulation 8(2)(b) of the EIR is to prevent a public authority from charging an applicant for examining in situ the requested information and to permit fees to be imposed only for supplying the information in some different way, e.g.  by provision of a copy of some sort. To put it simply, an authority that makes a charge for going and getting the information to make available for examination in situ, and refuses to make it so available unless the charge is paid, is not making that information available for examination without charge.”

Moreover, the FTT in Leeds City Council  further emphasised the Kirklees decision:

“[78] … Kirklees confirms that a public authority may not impose any charge or recover any cost for making information available for inspection. It would be wrong, in principle and in light of the purpose of the Directive, that a public authority which has not done the work necessary to put in place systems so that the information is in a form in which it can be inspected, free of charge, to be able to pass on to a requester the costs of locating and retrieving the information to put it into a format in which it can be made available.”

and went on to hold that:

[98] … having regard to the provisions and underlying aims of the legislation, the cost of ‘making available’ environmental information should be construed narrowly so as to apply only to the cost associated with the process of supplying (i.e. transferring) the information to an applicant once the requested information has been located, retrieved and put in disclosable form. Any other interpretation would have significant adverse consequences to those wishing to access environmental information.”

While the issue has not been the subject of a definitive decision by the CJEU it seems likely that this court will also follow the rationale of the Irish and UK cases. In fact in case C-217/97 Commission -v- Germany Advocate General Fennelly (as he then was and now a member of the Supreme Court) stated in his opinion at para 23:

“The notion of what is ‘reasonable‘ must in my view be interpreted in the light of the general scheme and purpose of the Directive, and of the context in which it is used. As already noted, the Directive proceeds upon the basis that access to environmental information will ‘improve environmental protection‘. Its primary objective is ‘to ensure freedom of access to … [such] information‘, and it seeks to achieve this end by obliging the Member States to ensure such informationis effectively ‘made available … to any natural or legal person at his request without his having to prove an interest‘. In the light of this objective and the means chosen to achieve it, the question of whether the charges for the supply of the information are ‘reasonable‘ must be judged from the perspective of the member of the public requesting the information, rather than from that of the public authority. While it does not expressly preclude a Member State levying a charge for the time and effort of public officials, such an approach seems to me to be fundamentally incompatible with the principal features of the Directive.”

Ultimately the ECJ (as it then was) did not need to rely on this element of AG Fennelly’s opinion but it seems likely that it would adopt it should the it be required to do so.

It seems that the conclusion to be drawn from these decisions is that there is a greater public interest in access to environmental information when compared to access generally under freedom of information. Accordingly, the question of which charges are permitted should be interpreted narrowly so that the objective of making environmental information available as widely as possible can be achieved. Therefore requesters should not be obliged to pay for the processing of a request, should be able to examine information in situ free of charge and should only pay the disbursements incurred by a public authority where copies of requested information is transmitted to them.

Ironically Mr Swords had to pay €150 to the Commissioner to lodge his appeal against a search and retrieval fee of €146.65 proposed by the Department of the Environment. Following the rationale of the Irish and UK decisions it seems unreasonable that the Commissioner should charge a fee for lodging an appeal since an appeal itself can be rightly viewed as a part of the processing of a request and not of supplying environmental information. Indeed very often an appeal to the Commissioner is necessary before any information is supplied.

At the very least it is now uncertain whether the Commissioner is entitled to levy this fee but we must wait until this issue itself is examined in an administrative tribunal or court before it can be resolved.

 

Search & retrieval fees no longer apply to AIE requests

Following an appeal by Pat Swords, the Commissioner for Environmental Information (detailed here) ruled that the Department of the Environment was not within its rights to charge search and retrieval fees on his request, as this was essentially contrary to the Access to Information on the Environment (AIE) 2007/2011 Regulations. The Department had 8 weeks in which to appeal that decision to the High Court, if they disagreed.

The Department has confirmed to TheStory.ie that they have not pursued an appeal.

The implication is that no public authority within the AIE regime may charge for search and retrieval. The Department has removed references to the previously mentioned €20.95/hour search and retrieval fee, and has advised us that it is in the process of updating guidance to public authorities in this matter.

So a note to members of the public and journalists: public authorities can no longer charge for search and retrieval for AIE requests. However, such fees still apply to FOI requests.

777 days and waiting … OFMDFM in no hurry to answer FOIs

Northern Ireland’s Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) record on Freedom of Information turns out to be a lot worse than the public have been aware of – with one request still unanswered after 777 days.

The Department hit the headlines last July when a requester was made wait 320 days for a reply. But figures just disclosed under FOI show the real picture is far worse, with five requests from 2011 still without a proper response and a further three which went without a reply for over two years.

The longest outstanding request is one from March 2011, a media enquiry about ‘Expenditure for Account Codes 2009/10’, which so far is lying unanswered for 26 months – a whopping total of 777 days. Another media enquiry, on credit card expenditure, is waiting for a response since July 2011 (674 days). A public request for titles of departmental files should have been answered 638 days ago, and media requests about ‘Correspondence between First Minister & named individual’ (594 days) and ministerial drivers (586 days) are also unanswered.

Among the ten which took more than a year – mostly answered within the last few weeks – were ones on Appointment of Consultant / NI Water Review Team (763 days), NI Travel Expenses (721 days), Properties outside Northern Ireland (742 days), and Ministerial Briefs (638 days). There were also three requests about Special Advisors, two of which were from a public representative.

In total, there were 97 requests in 2011 alone which were not answered in time. There is of course no guarantee that the responses, once provided, were adequate. Yet some of these ought in principle have been easy to respond to quickly, even with a refusal.

These new revelations will increase concerns that the Department, which was the subject of one fifth of all complaints to the Information Commissioner about Northern Ireland government departments, and which has been monitored by the Commissioner’s Office over its poor performance in responding, is failing to take Freedom of Information seriously.

Speaking to the Northern Ireland Assembly last year, Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness insisted that his department ‘compares favourably with that of other jurisdictions’. With the Commissioner’s monitoring report due any day now, transparency advocates will be watching with great concern to see whether the OFMDFM shows any signs of a real commitment to change.

OFMDFM Late Responses (Text)
Most of this information is available in the Department’s response to a Freedom of Information request at WhatDoTheyKnow.com.

Gamekeepers turned poachers

Here are some internal Dept of Finance documents on the move of a senior civil servant from the Department of Finance to Bank of Ireland.

Michael Torpey, who was employed on a salary of €200,000-plus annually, was transferred to the NTMA for three months and told not to work in his area of expertise – as part of a ‘cooling off period’.

He was asked not to return to his desk after Christmas because he had agreed to take a job in Bank of Ireland and was instead dispatched to the National Treasury Management Agency where, despite being an expert in banking, he was forbidden from working on any matter relating to it. Mr Torpey had been a key figure in the Department of Finance’s work on the restructuring of banks before being poached by Bank of Ireland late last year. He was due to begin work at the bank this month.

Once he announced his intention to leave his job, the Government insisted on a three-month ‘cooling off period’ funded by the taxpayer, according to documents released under Freedom of Information legislation. Mr Torpey’s move to Bank of Ireland caused concern in the Department of Finance, where there were issues raised over a possible conflict of interest.

Sinn Fein’s Pearse Doherty has raised questions over the move pointing out that Fine Gael had committed itself to a two-year cooling off period for senior civil servants moving to the private sector. He explained: ‘Michael Torpey – and I don’t want to cast aspersions on him personally – as head of state shareholder management unit had very sensitive information on all of the banks and now he has a senior appointment with Bank of Ireland.

“He has information on AIB – they are a direct competitor. And now to take up an executive position in a rival bank leads to all sorts of problems and all sorts of issues.”

The Department of Finance had said Mr Torpey would be subject to the provisions of the Official Secrets Act. But as Doherty said: “There is no “Men in Black” style machine to wipe his memory and say forget everything you knew.”

Elaine Byrne has also been looking at this area and published an interesting report on the increasingly frequent nature of such moves.

Documents obtained:



Great Southern Railways Stocks Tribunal Report

This is the Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into Dealings in Great Southern Railways Stocks between January 1943 and November 1943. With thanks to Conor Ryan of the Irish Examiner for scanning.



Judge cites NAMA's delay as crucial factor in decision not to grant stay

On Friday the High Court refused to grant a stay to NAMA pending its appeal to the Supreme Court against the February decision of the High Court that NAMA is a public authority and therefore subject to the Access to Information on the Environment Regulations.

The power to grant a stay pending an appeal is a discretionary power and the Court set out the test that should be applied when exercising its discretion. The Court was of the view that a balance of convenience-type test is appropriate whereby once there is an arguable appeal the Court must examine the relative prejudices flowing to various parties as a consequence of its decision to grant or refuse a stay. This test was recently enunciated in Danske Bank t/a National Irish Bank -v- McFadden.

The Court also drew support from Okunade -v- The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform a 2012 Supreme Court decision which considered how courts should approach interlocutory injunctions in public law matters.

In reaching his decision the judge acknowledged that more than 1,000 days had elapsed since the request was made and was critical of NAMA’s behaviour in refusing to deal with the request by sticking firmly to the narrow issue that it was not a public authority. Despite having the resources and means to do so, NAMA decided it was not a public authority and took no further steps to process the request  thereby neutralising the whole request and ensuring the process will take further time and result in further appeal to the Information Commissioner. This elongation was, the court found, a direct result of the unnecessarily narrow approach adopted by NAMA.

According to the judgment:

NAMA decided to dismiss Mr. Sheridan’s 2010 request for information on a threshold issue as to whether or not it was a public authority. No other decision has ever been taken by NAMA on his request even though it could have decided whether or not the information he sought comprised environmental information as defined and whether or not any of the mandatory or discretionary grounds for refusal of information were applicable. Thus, by framing its refusal so narrowly, NAMA have effectively neutralised the whole of Mr. Sheridan’s request and have ensured that the process is likely to take further time and result in further appeals to the Information Commissioner. The elongation of the process for deciding Mr. Sheridan’s request seems to be the direct result of the unnecessarily narrow approach adopted by NAMA in determining the request.

NAMA adduced no evidence to show that the processing of the request would be an unreasonable administrative burden nor that irreparable harm would be done should information be released in circumstances where it transpires that it is not a public authority. Since no information would actually be released the balance of prejudice favoured refusing a stay. Furthermore the judge also was of the view that the rights of third parties were amply protected by the mandatory and discretionary grounds for refusal. As the Court noted:

No substantive argument or fact has been put before me which would persuade me that dealing with Mr. Sheridan’s request will cause an undue burden, either administratively or financially to NAMA. If it were the case that dealing with his request would cause such difficulties, such an argument should have been made in detail and possibly by affidavit evidence.

This judgment is a clear signal that it is incumbent upon public bodies who wish to refuse access to information on the basis that they are not public authorities to deal with all issues arising under the request unless it is administratively burdensome to do so. They will receive little sympathy in the courts should a narrow position lead to significant delays in processing a request for information. It also is a signal that public bodies wishing to avail of discretionary court orders which introduce delays will need to show specific evidence of immediate, irreparable harm before a court will make an order that unreasonably prolongs the processing of a request.

This judgment sets an important precedent in relation to how the courts expect to see requests for environmental information handled by public bodies  While the Commissioner for Environmental Information’s procedures did not feature in the judgment it is also certain that this judgment will have to be reflected in her office’s procedures.

While TheStory also made arguments in relation to EU and international law, the Court seemed to be satisfied that it had sufficient authority under national law to refuse a stay. It appears that we will have to wait until another time for further judicial consideration of the application of EU and international law to issues arising under the Aarhus Convention.

NAMA stay judgment

This is the judgment given by Judge Colm Mac Eochaidh on Friday morning in relation to NAMA vs the Commissioner for Environmental Information. In it, he refused to grant NAMA a stay on his February 2013 judgment that NAMA was a public authority under the Access to Information on the Environment Regulations 2007. He made the judgment following this blog’s submission to the court, both orally and in writing. The Commissioner took a neutral position on the stay.

In light of this judgment, NAMA sought and was granted a two week continuation of the stay to consider its position. It expires on May 3.

We believe this to be generally a very significant judgment for access to information, and for the Regulations. Fred will have a legal analysis later tonight.



Observations on the NAMA AIE judicial review

The experience in court yesterday highlights the unfairness of the judicial review procedure in relation to High Court appeals by public authorities under the Access to Information on the Environment Regulations.

Gavin as the requester had no automatic right to be a notice party to the proceedings even though his right of access to information formed the subject matter and the decision of the Court to grant of a stay could affect that right adversely.

Luckily the judge asked that Gavin be invited to address the court. He was, in fact, the only party to put arguments against a stay being granted since the Commissioner has decided to remain neutral on this issue.

We already know that in late 2011 the Commissioner was on the point of consenting to an application by NAMA to ask the court to find in its favour and thereby ending the appeal and reversing the Commissioner’s decision. Without being a notice party we do not know why or in what circumstances the Commissioner continued to fight the appeal. Crucially, we did not have the right to make submissions on the issue but rather had to rely on the discretion of the Commissioner to inform us of the position.

It goes without saying that this situation is fundamentally unfair.

Indeed, Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention guarantees applicants a fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive judicial review process. However serious question marks must be raised concerning how this provision is implemented in Ireland since there is no automatic right for an applicant to be a notice party to judicial review proceedings initiated by a public authority against an administrative decision.

It is not like the State has no experience of this issue. Ireland has already lost a case in similar circumstances when the European Commission took Ireland to the ECJ concerning the non-implementation of the “not prohibitively costly” element of the review obligations. The ECJ  found that discretionary practices (in relation to costs) cannot be considered to be a valid implementation of an obligation. Yet here we are today and a requester for environmental information has no automatic right to participate in the appeal procedure initiated by a public authority.

This ECJ decision led to the enactment of Part 2 of the Environment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011 which means that now costs may not be awarded against plaintiffs in certain judicial review cases relating to environmental law unless there are exceptional circumstances.

Leaving aside costs, the NAMA -v- Commissioner for Environmental Information case has exposed further flaws in the procedures for environmental judicial review where a public authority is the appellant. With a minimum 7 year delay for a final appeal in the Supreme Court the procedures clearly lack the timeliness required under the Aarhus Convention and with no automatic right to be a notice party a fundamental lack of fairness is built in to the structure of the current review procedure.

 

The High Court, NAMA and a stay

This morning we attended the High Court after being invited by Judge Colm Mac Eochaidh to make a submission to the court in relation to NAMA seeking a stay on his judgment pending an appeal to the Supreme Court. This is the submission I read to the Court. Brian Murray SC, for NAMA, made a number of points about why NAMA had not behaved tactically, and was simply seeking to exercise its right to appeal. They also appeared concerned that if a stay was not granted, they would be subject to a flood of requests for information.

At the end, Judge Mac Eochaidh asked if I wish to respond – and I did on one specific point first – that the Regulations require a public authority to assist a requester and NAMA had not done so (having made an earlier point RE the process of reviewing and releasing information), and an additional final point – that NAMA will be subject to information requests, come what may, given that they will be subject to Freedom of Information Act according to the draft amendment published in 2012.

Overall the point we were making, and which Mr Murray did not address, is that the State has obligations under international treaties, under the Convention, under European law and under Irish law that citizens have timely processes in judicial and access to information procedures. These obligations are not voluntary – that’s why they’re called obligations. The rights of all Irish citizens are being infringed when processes such as this take this long.

Submission read in Court on April 17: